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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers the utility of the cusp catastrophe as a model for display, analysis, 
and interpretation of a line of cases dealing with a well-defined legal issue. We give a very 
brief discussion of the judicial process in the United States, the form of presentation of 
decisions, and the methods of research common to lawyers in this country. The paper 
presents this information in view of the facts that the ordinary professional in mathematics 
or computing is unlikely to be aware of many of the details: while readers outside the 
United States are likely to be familiar with quite a different legal system. At the present 
time, research on the continent in this area apparently is somewhat in advance of that 
here 111. 
Recent investigations of the American Bar Foundation have made consideration of the 
proposed application of catastrophy theory both possible and timely. Haar, Sawyer, and 
Cummings [23 analyzed 79 cases which came before the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
dealing with zoning amendment litigation over a period of more than twenty years, be- 
ginning in 1950, as a basis for their model. We recommend a study of their investigation 
to nonlawyers who may be or may become interested in the application of mathematics, 
statistics, and computers to the law. Their paper discusses the legal issues at some length 
in traditional lawyer fashion before describing the construction of a linear model based 
on their legal analysis. 
A principal difficulty confronting the computer analysis of the law in the United States 
arises from the nature of the common law system and the manner of reporting the deci- 
sions, in that the courts do not decide cases in a fashion naturally adapted to legal analysis 
but rather chronologically as the parties bring their disputes before the tribunal. Conse- 
quently, the common law system of jurisprudence requires an elaborate finding system 
for its operation which, in the United States, has developed largely in private hands 
outside the judicial system proper. Two common procedures for locating the law pertinent 
to a given situation or fact pattern are either by means of legal digests or by means of 
legal encyclopedias. Entry through the digests is somewhat complicated, but entry 
through the encyclopedias parallels the use of ordinary encyclopedias. 
We try to indicate in a very small space the problems of an attorney facing a client 
who brings a dispute for his advice or recommendation. Naturally, the dispute is apt to 
be one with which the attorney is familiar, but otherwise he is confronted with the problem 
of locating the law by means of the digests or the encyclopedias. This paper includes a 
bare bones discussion of the usual methods of legal research. 
This information is presented in order not only to try to convince our readers that this 
application of catastrophe theory may survive the Sussman barrier, but also to introduce 
the reader to a very live area in which computers and mathematics have significant legal 
applications. As further evidence, we point out that there are two commercial legal data 
base systems on the market, WESTLAW, which is the product of the West Publishing 
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Company, the largest among those in the legal publishing field, and LEXIS, a service of 
Mead Data Centrgl. There are two new journals: CompaterILa+t- Joarnal published by 
the Center for Computer/Law, 675 South Westmorland Avenue, Los Angeles, California 
9005 and Ratgers Journal qf’ Comprrters, Technology, and the LUIC~, Rutgers Law 
School, 1.5 Washington Street, Newark, New Jersey 07102. 
2. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 
The judicial system of the United States began as and continues to be a part of the 
common law tradition. We use the term “common law” to distinguish the law of most 
English speaking countries from that of Roman law, modem civil law, and other systems 
of law. This English common law developed out of the custom of considering prior 
decisions of the courts as precedents by which to decide a case at bar in terms of examples 
or authority arising from the earlier holdings. Here, the fundamental concept is that of 
stare decisis which has been defined [31 as 
‘6 
. . (T)hat when (ai court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of 
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially 
the same.” 
While the case law played the most important single role in the development of our legal 
system, it must be kept in mind that statutes, treaties, administrative decisions, and rules 
have enjoyed a significant part as well. 
The judicial system of the United States is complex beyond that of most common law 
countries as a result of our federal system of government dividing the judicial and legal 
powers between the federal and the state governments according to constitutional dictates 
and long tradition. As a consequence of this division, our country has 51 judicial systems 
rather than only one as have most nations. Unfortunately, the division of power is not 
sufficiently sharp to permit one to search only the federal law or only the appropriate 
state law in deciding a legal question in all cases. This difficulty is complicated by an 
even worse one. 
The sequence in which cases come before the U.S. and state courts for decision is 
completely independent of the subject matter of the suit or the legal issue in dispute, but 
depends entirely on the docket numbers assigned by the clerks of the various courts. The 
location of the case on the docket is a function of when the two attorneys can get their 
respective cases ready for trial and complete the required legal formalities. Thus, in 569 
Federul Reporter, 2nd Series, there appears Massuchasetts General Hospital v. Weiner, 
a case for declaratory relief and injunction, followed by Norman v. Hall, a criminal 
prosecution for rape and assault and battery, in turn succeeded by de Waker v. Pueblo 
Intern . . Inc . . a suit for damages resulting from a false charge of shoplifting. The number 
569 means, of course, that this is Vol. 569 of the Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, i.e., there 
are 568 earlier volumes of some 1000 pages each preceeding this one. West publishes 15 
different reporter series of varying, but similar magnitude, which supposedly include all 
the case law of the 51 distinct jurisdictions of the United States. These cases are decided 
by the courts and appear in the reporters in the chronological sequence of their decision 
absolutely without regard for legal issues or subject matter content. The ordinary law 
library of a law school will contain thousands of volumes of case law, almost all reported 
in the manner outlined above. 
These cases appear in a rather standard format with the title presented in the form 
Jones v. Green where usually, but not always, Jones is plaintiff and Green is defendant 
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in the suit. They appear frequently in an official reporter, but almost always in an unof- 
ficial reporter such as those published by West. For example, under Rodriqtte: v. Tctylor, 
569 F. 2d 1231 (1977), one finds docket number 76-2609-76-2641, decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, decided Dec. 27, 1977, followed by a short 
summary of the facts. Here, plaintiff brought suit challenging Philadelphia’s policy of 
refusing to hire anyone over the age of 41 years as a security officer asserting that the 
policy was in violation of age discrimination in the Employment Act. Following this short 
summary of the case there is a sequence of headnotes. in this particular instance, there 
are 23, an unusually large number beginning with 
1. Federal Courts (Key) 945, where in age discrimination in the Employment Act suit, 
the district court assessed liquidated damages in an amount equal to an underlying award 
of unpaid wages, insofar as the district court on remand might reduce the back pay award 
by setting off interim earnings, the equivalent liquidated damages penalty was to be 
likewise reduced. Age discrimination in the Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2-17. 29 
U.S.C.A. $5 621-634. 
13. Federal Civil Procedure (Key) 2737. Although district courts have discretion in 
calculating an award of attorney’s fees, exercise of such discretion must conform to 
proper standards and procedures; failure to adhere to generally applicable rules and cri- 
teria may constitute a “misuse” of discretion. 
23. Federal Courts (Key) 945 . . . 
The key numbers and headnotes are followed by lists of counsel appearing in the case 
then by the opinion rendered by the court. These key numbers and headnotes form the 
basis of one of our principal law finders, The Atnericun Digest of the West Publishing 
Company. When a West editor receives an opinion handed down by a court, he prepares 
the corresponding West reporter edition by carefully reading the case for its principal 
points of law and classifying each of them under the more than four hundred, including 
such items as automobiles, contracts, infants, w.ills, zoning, and other topics of the West 
digest system. He further searches the case for statutes construed, points involving the 
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, issues concerning the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and words and phrases defined by courts in this case. West first publishes the 
edited version in one of its advance sheets which contains an index of the statutes con- 
strued, the issues involving federal rules and other items mentioned above at the front of 
the publication. In particular, the key numbers are collected for all the cases reported in 
the advance sheet and are presented alphabetically by topic, each topic containing its 
corresponding key numbers in numerical order. When the advance sheets are periodically 
accumulated and replaced by their corresponding bound volumes, these indices are sim- 
ilarly accumulated and placed at the front of the bound volumes. The collections from 
the bound volumes are accumulated in turn and compiled by West in The American 
Digest and in a companion publication Words and Phrases. We try to illustrate the use 
of the key numbers by a short introduction to legal analysis. 
Suppose Mr. Speck appears in Mr. Land’s law office with the story that he suffered 
an injured back at a college wrestling match when the referee was shoved from the ring 
and fell on Mr. Speck. Although Mr. Land has spent his prior career reading real estate 
abstracts, he must now elicit the crucial facts from Mr. Speck and determine the relevant 
law. Further discussion reveals that although Speck had purchased a reserve seat ticket, 
he was standing in an area forbidden to spectators when the accident occurred. One 
possible approach by Land to the relevant cas e law is through the Descriptive Words 
section of Tl7e Atnericun Digest. He enters by developing a list of words under the 
general headings of Parties, Places and Things, Basis of Action or Issue, Defense, and 
Relief Sought in the context of the facts and circumstances obtained from Mr. Speck. 
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Under Parties he may list spectator, wrestler, referee, promoter, and college with which 
to begin his search. Beneath the topic REFEREE, he finds 
Wrestling match referee thrown from the ring and injuring spectator, contributory 
negligence. THEATER 6. 
Beneath the topic SPECTATORS, he finds 
Injuries-athletic events, assumption of risk. THEATERS 6(18). 
Therefore, Land obtains the key numbers, THEATERS 6 and THEATERS 6( 18). These 
key numbers furnish the subject matter entry into the case law. By going to them in The 
American Digest, Mr. Land can determine those cases which deal with the issues of Mr. 
Speck’s injury and can determine whether or not Mr. Speck has a legal claim against the 
college. In addition to this procedure, West provides an entry into the key numbers by 
means of topic analysis and by means of a table of cases. With respect to these, if Mr. 
Land can remember the name of a plaintiff or defendant in a relevant case, then he can 
locate the case in the table of cases and thereby find the appropriate key numbers. 
Naturally there are many other approaches to the law and other publishing companies, 
in particular, The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company which provide an ap- 
proach to the case law. We turn to another procedure. 
The West company publishes Corpus Juris Secundum, a legal encyclopedia, which 
not only illuminates the law in the manner of the usual encyclopedia, but also cites the 
reader to topic, key numbers, and cases. Consequently, it is the most logical first source 
when an attorney is confronted with an unfamiliar legal problem. Doubtless, Mr. Land 
would have been well-advised to begin here. 
Before leaving this ridiculously short introduction to the methods of legal research, it 
should be noted that the LEXIS and WESTLAW legal data bases are arranged for 
searching according to these ideas. Such data bases help alleviate one of the chronic 
problems of the lawyer, to wit, that the law is in perpetual flux. Consequently, having 
found a case in point, the attorney must make every effort to determine if the case has 
been overturned or distinguished by a later opinion. Before the advent of these data 
bases, Shepard’s Citations were the traditional method for locating later cases which 
dealt with the same point of law or legal issue. 
3. THE LINEAR MODEL OF HAAR 
Having outlined the judicial system of the United States and some of the basic tools 
of legal research, we wish to discuss a linear model of a specific area of law developed 
by C. M. Haar and others 121, but first we wish to quote from his paper: 
“For Tiresias and the soothsayers of antiquity, prediction of Future events was an art clouded 
in mystery, wrapped in riddles. Today, lawyers advise their clients in carefully guarded professional 
terms about the probable future of potential litigation. Legal precedents hidden in the comers of 
recorded cases are scrutinized as closely as were the entrails of pigeons by the high priests of 
Apollo. Lawyers expend time and energy probing case law, searching for patterns, discerning 
trends, then struggling to impress the court with the similarities or differences between their clients’ 
cases and the cherished legal precedents. Inferences are drawn from footnotes; asides are put under 
a magnifying lens; omissions, dissents, and changes in phraseology are all paraded out. Yet this 
process-in crucial aspects-is no less mysterious than that of the Greek seers and reflects as much 
intuition, resulting from personal immersion in the cases, as it does a rational process of analysis 
and dissection . . . Just as other areas of the social sciences have turned to computer analysis for 
assistance in sorting and analyzing complex sets of data, so could law.” 
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Haar, Sawyer, and Cummings formed a team of two lawyers and one statistician to 
make a study of the case law developed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in zoning 
amendment cases. The two lawyers made a conventional legal analysis of 79 cases and 
determined a collection of 167 issues which possibly influenced the decisions. A signifi- 
cance test was run on this collection with the result that only 40 of the issues or variables 
w.ere retained for analysis. With only 79 cases, the number 40 was too large for regression 
analysis so that a correlation matrix was computed for 32 of the variables, 8 having been 
eliminated by other arguments. The final result was a grouping of the variables into 11 
scales which are listed below: 
Scale l-Compatibility Indicated by Change in the Character of the Neighborhood 
Scale 2-Use not needed 
Scale 3-Adequate Physical Planning 
Scale 4-Public Interest Planning and Zoning Techniques 
Scale 5-Compatibility from an Economic Perspective 
Scale 6-Zone Change Detrimental 
Scale i-Physical Services Inadequate 
Scale 8-Compatibility Indicated by Large Uniform Blocks 
Scale P-Good Planning Practice 
Scale lO-Character of Area Supports Change 
Scale 1 l-Large-Area Zoning. 
In addition to these scales, two of the original variables were retained in the regression 
analysis, to wit, 
011-The Court of Common Please Approved/Denied the Zone Change 
012-The Zoning Authority Denied/Approved the Zone Change. 
Variables 011 and 012 were not included in the factor analysis since the investors wished, 
for a variety of reasons, to include them in the regression model. The efforts of Haar and 
his colleagues lead to three different linear models, each of the general form 
E = A + CIVl + .-* + C,V,, 
where the coefficients of the three models are listed in Table 1. 
Using the conventional notion that plaintiff wins with a preponderance of the evidence 
in his favor, one may assume that if the value for a given fact pattern produces a number 
larger than 0.50, then there is a predition of verdict for plaintiff. the formula can be 
written for the basic model as 
E = 0.56523 + 0.16121 Voll - 0.55106V012 - 0.25548& + 0.2150638 - 
0.19320& + 0.11884&r + 0.05265&. 
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Since the variables are assumed to take on only the values 0 and 1, those coefficients 
with plus signs are essentially for plaintiff and those with minus signs are essentially for 
defendant. Depending on the fact pattern. the court of common pleas will have approved 
Voll = 1, or will have disapproved V 011 = 0; the zoning authority will have denied the 
zone change Volz = 1, or will have approved vo12 = 0, and so forth and so on for the 
remaining. 
Haar and his colleagues have assessed the interrelation of their linear model and con- 
ventional legal analysis [21 to which the reader is recommended for a fuller discussion. 
Since their observations probably apply generally to any successful mathematical or sta- 
tisticai model, we note some of them. Haar states that computer analysis leads to a better 
organized approach to a legal problem in that the data preparation requires a highly 
systematic examination of the cases. Furthermore, computer modelling displays the rule 
of the case as a relationship between the facts and outcome that can be mathematically 
expressed to the extent, of course, that the researcher can ascertain precisely what the 
facts were before the court. Moreover, the disciplined reading required for computer 
study of cases reduces the casual meandering through the key factors more likely in a 
study based on a case-by-case evaluation. As a final bonus, the evaluation of the research 
and conclusions by another lawyer not familiar with the cases is simplified by the orga- 
nization necessary for the computer. Such presentation eases the task of a newcomer to 
the selected area of law by the systematization of the material. We turn to a catastrophic 
model related to this study. 
4. THE CATASTROPHIC MODEL 
We base our discussion on general concepts developed by Zeeman, in particular, on 
those of Zeeman [4] and others concerning institutional disturbances. Thus, we observe 
that the factors underlying a judicial decision may be classified either as (1) evidence 
supporting the position of plaintiff denoted by the symbol P, or (2) evidence supporting 
that of the defendant denoted by D. One must keep in mind, of course, that who is 
plaintiff and who is defendant may depend on which party wins the race to the court 
house, not on the nature of the dispute involved. Since who is defendant and who is 
plaintiff is somewhat arbitrary, this may require a switch in the axes of any given model, 
i.e., defendant assumes the role of plaintiff and plaintiff assumes the role of defendant. 
We recall that plaintiff wins his case provided the trier of fact, sometimes a judge or 
sometimes a jury, find a preponderance of the evidence is his favor. Regarding D and P 
as conflicting factors in a judicial process enjoying a suitably discontinuous behavior, we 
arrive by the Zeemanian process at 
Hypothesis 1. The graph G of the judicial procedure is a cusp catastrophe with plain- 
tiffs evidence P and defendant’s evidence D as conflicting factors affecting the outcome. 
As usual, Fig. 1 depicts the surface G as split into two parts, an upper part denoted 
as judgment,Cor the pluintiff and lower part denoted as judgment for the dejkndant. This 
surface lies over the D,P-plane, the control spcrce in the standard terminology, and 
consists of a single sheet for the most part. However, above a V-shaped region loosely 
centered between the P and D axes, the surface G consists of an upper sheet which is 
part of judgment for the plaintiff and a lower sheet which is part of judgment for the 
defendant together with a section joining these two. 
The smndurd model of the cusp catastrophe is given by the equation 
P= y+xz, 
where ; is called the response, x the splitting factor, and .v the normal factor. The 
FOR DEFENDANT 
CUSP 
SET 0 X 
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Fig. 1. The cusp catastrophe. 
variables P and D are linearly related, as can be seen by Fig. 1, to the standard variables 
x and y. In terms of the standard variables, the graph of the surface G corresponds to 
the portion given by 
3P 5 x, 
the threshold surface linking the upper and lower parts of G, judgment for the plaintiff 
with judgment for the defendant, corresponds to 
322 < x, 
and the fold curve between them to 39 = x. The projection of the fold curve into the 
control space, now the x,y-plane, is given by 
27y2 = 4x3 
which defines the two sides of the V-curve known as the bifurcation set B. The bifur- 
cation set B determines the catastrophic behavior of the judicial process. To see this, in 
Fig. 1 consider transversing the tine HK in the direction from H to K and notice that as 
one crosses the right branch of the bifurcation set B there is a catastrophic jump from 
the judgment for defendant sheet to judgment for the plaintiff. Such sudden jumps are 
characteristic of the discontinuous properties of the catastrophic models, i.e., one gets 
a sudden change. 
There are various reasons why small shifts occur in the structure of the catastrophic 
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surfaces. For example, society contains numerous natural plaintiff-defendant pairs in- 
cluding creditors v. debtors, mortgagees v. mortgagors, and insurers v. insureds along 
with many more who are eternally trying to better their posture before the courts. In 
view of this, all of them attempt to obtain favorable legislation, bring propitious rather 
than unpropitious cases before the courts and to write one-sided clauses favoring them- 
selves into their contracts. 
Hypothesis 2. There is a tendency for the judicial process as a whole to avoid the 
extremes of “judgment for the plaintiff’ or “judgment for the defendant.” 
Zeeman regards this phenomena as a sort of flow on the catastrophic surface repre- 
senting a feedback from the parties to the court which tends to prevent final stability in 
the system. There are other influences on the judicial process brought about by such 
things as one lawyer being more effective than another, one jury being more objective 
than another, one judge having more judicial competence than a brother with the overall 
result that in addition to feedback there is a certain amount of what Zeeman calls “noise” 
in the process. He visualizes such noise as forcing a particular case under considemtion 
off the stable locus. As a consequence, there may occasionally arise catastrophic transfers 
from the mere presence of noise in the system. Zeeman presents this observation as a 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. External' events, or internal incidents, within the judicial process may 
be represented as stochastic noise. 
Re-examining the model of Haar without Scale 4, we note that for plaintiff one has 
Scale 8 0.213 Compatibility Indicated by Large Uniform Blocks 
Var. 011 0.183 Court of Common Pleas Decision Favorable 
Scale 11 0.120 Large Area Zoning 
Scale 10 0.067 Character of Area Supports Change. 
For defendant, Scale 6 consists of two variables and has a value of -0.19139. The two 
variables with their respective weights are 
170 -0.11037 Adverse Impact on Adjacent Lots-Weight 1.80 
106 -0.07358 Character of Area Improving-Weight 1.20. 
With this splitting of Scale 6, one has for defendant 
Var. 012 -59198 Zoning Authority Decision Unfavorable 
Scale 7 -.25450 Physical Services Inadequate 
Var. 170 -. 11037 Adverse Impact on Adjacent Lots 
Var. 106 - .07358 Character of Area Improving. 
Turning to the problem of reducing a nine-dimensional model to a three-dimensional 
one, we proceed in the following manner. For plaintiff assume there are but four issues 
which can be found in any fact pattern or that can be offered in evidence to the court, 
namely, Ss, Voll, Sll, and SlO. We denote the subset of issues present by means of a 
binary number, where 1 means that S 1,, is present alone, 11 means that SiO and Sil are 
present, 100 means that Voll is present alone, and 1000 means that Se is present alone. 
According to the scheme indicated, each of the integers 1 through 15 defines a unique 
fact pattern for plaintiff. Thus, the weight of evidence corresponding to the fact pattern 
defined by 111 equals 0.067 + 0.120 + 0.183 = 0.370. (Note that one progresses from 
small to large probabilities with the patterns.) If one applies this device to all fact patterns 
for plaintiff and defendant, one obtains Table 2. 
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1 0.067 -0.074 
2 0.120 -0.110 
3 0.187 -0.184 
4 0.183 -0.254 
5 0.250 -0.328 
6 0.303 -0.364 
7 0.370 -0.438 
8 0.213 -0.592 
9 0.280 -0.666 
10 0.333 -0.702 
11 0.400 -0.776 
12 0.396 -0.846 
13 0.463 -0.920 
14 0.516 -0.956 
15 0.583 - I .030 
From their discussion, it appears that Zeeman and his co-workers made a linear anal- 
ysis of their prison riot data before settling upon a method of computing tension and 
alienation somewhat analogously to the calculations reported in Table 2. After establish- 
ing these estimates, Zeeman made a time-series analysis of his data to locate the bifur- 
cation set. We neither have the raw data collected by Haar to construct a time sequence 
nor do we believe that such a sequence is necessarily appropriate for the analysis of 
Haar’s data. Yet, the rather marked changes in probabilities of Table 2 favoring the 
plaintiff between 7 and 8 reminds one of a catastrophic shift. One visualizes a lower sheet 
of judgment for the defendant determined by suitable values of D, while P takes on the 
values 1, 2, 3,4, 8, 9, and 10 and an upper sheet of judgment for the plaintiff determined 
by suitable values of D when P takes on the values 5, 6, 7, 11, and 12. 
A great deal of arbitrariness arises whenever one attempts to reduce higher dimensional 
data to lower, as in our example, where we try to reduce the sets of issues to a linear set 
by means of the binary definition of subset. Necessarily, we offer this procedure oniy as 
a possibility for reducing the dimension of the problem. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the legal profession speaks regularly of the evidence for the plaintiff and for the 
defendant: In civil cases one party wins by a preponderunce of the evidence, in criminal 
cases the prosecutor must establish the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt, a 
motion for summary judgment is overruled whenever the judge holds there is substantial 
evidence for the opposing party, a motion for a new trial is granted whenever the judge 
feels the verdict is against the clear weight sf the evidence, and our judicial system 
depends for its daily operation on these rather ad hoc estimates of the judges. 
We turn to a few remarks about the practical problems of using computers for the 
application of mathematical and statistical methods to problems in law. The reader should 
realize these remarks are only to direct attention to some relevant papers, not in any 
sense to outline or summarize their ideas and arguments. 
5. BASIC PROBLEMS IN COMPUTER-ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH 
For law firms, which can afford the service, a number of data bases are available of 
which the best known in the United States are LEXIS and WESTLAW. The implemen- 
tation and cost of these services are reviewed by a dedicated user 151 who observes these 
particular services tend to be complementary rather than competitive. The principal dif- 
ficulty with their use is the cost which tends to outrun the budget for smaller law firms. 
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While there has been an effort to provide such service by the use of public terminals 161, 
these have enjoyed limited success for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, these data 
bases are commercially available and provide decided cases from the federal and state 
courts, various articles from the United States Code, and various federal regulations such 
as tax law and tmde regulations. 
The WESTLAW system retrieves information according to their key number system 
and LEXIS by means of words and phrases agumented by means of various Boolean 
Algebra operations. In either instance, the information is essentially the same as would 
be obtained by traditional legal research although it may be more complete and more 
quickly obtained. 
In addition to the cost, a second difficulty is that the principal problem of the lawyer 
is the analysis, rather than the accumulation, of a large number of cases in point. Clearly 
the efforts of C. M. Haar to provide a linear model of a line of cases constitutes a 
nontrivial achievement in solving this problem. Not only should the results provide sub- 
stantial aid to parties involved in zoning amendment cases in Connecticut, but their 
procedure obtains all that could be reasonably expected of mathematical analysis at the 
present time. Consequently, there is a need to apply their methodology to other well- 
defined legal situations perhaps by teams from the law and mathematical divisions of 
universities. 
Unfortunately, the method of Haar requires a large component of traditional legal 
investigation, likely more than goes into many important legal cases, before computer 
analysis takes place. Consequently, their present approach may be better adapted to 
academic law review work than to law practice per se. A procedure is needed whereby 
the practicing attorney may start with a data base such as WESTLAW or LEXIS and 
produce a model, or a satisfactory substitute, similar to that of Haar, without the need 
of the protracted legal study. 
A member of the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law has suggested 
a somewhat different approach to legal information retrieval [71. Bing discusses the pos- 
sibility of a retrieval strategy based on natural language inquiries rather than on some 
artificial system and compares the efficiency of the two. Bing and Harvold have won the 
Norwegian Royal Academic Gold Medal for their book, Legal Decisions and fnforma- 
bon Systems, available in North America from Columbia University Press. Various 
articles 18, 9, 101 investigate other techniques of legal data retrieval and analysis. 
So far, the author has located no articles dealing directly with applications of numerical 
taxonomy 1111 or with cluster analysis [12] in the law. The methods of data retrieval 
employed by WESTLAW or LEXIS are unknown to the author, but assuming they use 
some vector-based retrieval strategy [7], as seems likely, both numerical taxonomy and 
cluster analysis could be employed. In a vector-based retrieval strategy, each document 
in the data base is assigned a name consisting of a vector whose length is that of the 
number of words (or key words) in the data base. For example, in cases dealing with 
motor vehicle accidents, one might obtain a segment of the document vectors consisting 
of 
accident . . . car . . . negligence . . . traffic light . . . comer, 
where in Case A the number 10 shows that the word accident occurs 10 times in the 
opinion, the number 5 implies that the word cur appears 5 times in the opinion and so 
forth and so on. It seems virtually certain that a more complete analysis could be obtained 
by the further use of numerical taxonomy or cluster analysis on computers if the vectors 
defining the cases, or substantial segments thereof, were made available to the investi- 
gator. 
Catastrophe theory and law 329 
REFERENCES 
1. J. Bing and T. Harvold. Lepcrl Dcci.sions md /~~.formrrio~~ .S.vvtrm.t. Norwegian University Press, Oslo 
(1977). 
2. C. M. Haar, J. P. Sawyer. Jr., and S. J. Cummings, Computer Power and Legal Reasoning: A Case Study 
of Judicial Decision Prediction in Zoning Amendment Cases. A. B. F. Res. j.. 651-768 (1977). 
3. E. M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis. H’uvne Lm, RPI.. 21, 1043 (1975). 
4. E. C. Zeeman, Carcrstrophe Theor.v: Selected- P~prrs (1972-1977). Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
(1977). 
5. R. M. McGonigal, Implementation and Cost Effectiveness of Computerized Legal Research-LEXIS and 
WESTLAW Compared. Comp~rerlL~~~)t~ J. 1, 359-378 (1978). 
6. F. M. Greauras and L. L. Carhle. Reoort of the Public Terminal Studv. CommrerlLn~~~ J. 1, 255-357 
(1978). - 
7. J. Bing, Legal Information Retrieval Systems: The Need for and the Design of Extremely Simple Retrieval 
Strategies. Cnmpurer/Law J. 1, 379-399 (1978). 
8. R. C. Lawlor, Amplification Factor of an Information Retrieval System. Jllrinwfrics ./. 15, 289-302 (1975): 
The Chancellor’s Foot: A Modern View. Ho~r~to,i Lm, Ret,. 6, 630-664 (1969). 
9. L. T. McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning. 
Hunwrd LNM. Rel.. 90, 837 (1977). 
10. J. A. Sprowl, Automating the Legal Reasoning Process: A Computer That Uses Regulations and Statutes 
to Draft Legal Documents. A. B. F. Reg. .I.. l-81 (1979). 
11. P. H. A. Sneath and R. R. Sokai. ,Vurnericu/ Ta.ronoriz.r, Freeman, San Francisco (1973). 
12. J. A. Hartigan, Clustering A/gorithns. Wiley, New York (1975). 
